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Abstract
We study two governments, each considering whether or not to compete to
attract a foreign monopoly Þrm into its own domestic market. The compe-
tition, should it occur, would involve oﬀering incentives to the Þrm. The
incentives, which are costly for the governments to provide, lower the Þrms
marginal cost of production. Faced with the oﬀers from each country, the
Þrm must choose one of four options: to enter either of the markets, produce
there and export to the other, to enter both markets simultaneously with
only local production, or to reject all oﬀers. We Þnd conditions under which
it would be optimal for one of the two countries not to compete with the
other, preferring instead to import the commodity from the country that at-
tracted the Þrm, rather than incurring the additional costs that would have
been necessary to make its own economy more attractive to the foreign Þrm.
We show that when importing the good is a possibility, there are conditions
under which, knowing that it will lose (win) the competition for the Þrm, the
country nonetheless Þnds it optimal to (not) compete. Also, we derive the
market structure by establishing the relationship between the option chosen
by the Þrm and the characteristics of the two governments trying to attract
the Þrm.
JEL ClassiÞcations: F21, F23, L1
Should Governments Compete for Foreign
Direct Investment?*
1 Introduction
In this paper we model the decision processes of two countries that are con-
sidering whether or not to compete to attract a foreign Þrm to produce in
their respective domestic markets. We provide some answers to such ques-
tions as: Under what conditions should a country compete with another for
foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than simply import? If a country
knows that it will lose the competition for FDI, are there conditions under
which it should still compete? If a country knows that it will win the com-
petition for FDI, are there conditions under which it should not compete? If
a country chooses to compete with another, how do the countrys character-
istics, as well as its oﬀers, succeed in attracting FDI? Should a Þrm set up in
one country exclusively and export to the other, or set up in both countries,
engaging only in local production?
The interest in FDI over recent decades has led to many empirical investi-
gations exploring the relationship between the ßow and/or stock of FDI that
a country receives and a variety of economic and political factors. The results
of these empirical analyses have produced a rough consensus concerning the
determinants of FDI. For example, the UN Economic Commission of Eu-
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ropes Economic Survey of Europe1 states there is a general agreement that
the following characteristics are associated with larger ßows of FDI: macroe-
conomic and political stability, developed infrastructure, good legal system
and law enforcement, availability of skilled labor, foreign sector liberalization,
location and country (market) size and natural endowment.2
Empirical investigations have also led to a series of stylized facts that are
said to characterize FDI. A list of such facts is given in Markusen (1995),
where he notes on the macro side: FDI has grown rapidly, it takes place
largely between developed countries and within that context between sub-
groupings of countries, much of it is horizonal as well as intra-Þrm in nature,
and evidence that it relates to diﬀerences in factor endowments or in returns
to capital is still wanting. On the micro side he notes: FDI is industry
speciÞc, it seems to be associated with technologically advanced products
and technologically advantaged labor forces, it is concentrated in Þrms with
signiÞcant intangible assets, it may be negatively correlated with plant-level
scale economies while positively correlated with Þrm size and longevity, and
there are still questions concerning its relationship to shipping costs and trade
barriers.
Recently, several papers have investigated whether or not the presence
1United Nations Economic Commission of Europe (2001), Economic Survey of Europe
2001:1, Ch. 5, p. 188. When speciÞcally studying FDI patterns in transition economies,
Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (2002) add privatization method and government
red tape to these fundamentals.
2For recent contributions to this literature see, for example, Carr, Markusen and
Maskus (2002), Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (2002), Borensztein, De Gre-
gorio and Lee (1998), Lipsey (2001), and Saggi (2002).
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of corruption enhances or hinders a countrys ability to attract FDI.3 Wei
(2000b) Þnds that, taking account of both government restrictions on FDI as
well as government incentives to encourage FDI, corruption is associated with
a signiÞcant and substantial negative impact on FDI. Wei (2000a) estimates
the cost of an increase in the corruption level in terms of a corresponding in-
crease in the marginal tax rate. In a study focusing directly on Russia, Brock
(1998) Þnds, in a regional investigation, that crime and risk are negatively
correlated with FDI.
Empirical studies, however, by construction, are conditioned on the deci-
sions made by the various countries to attract FDI, and thus cannot help us
explore those decisions themselves. Yet, with the fall of communism and the
subsequent emergence of market-based countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, the decisions made by governments in regard to economic development,
and to FDI in particular, have been pushed into higher proÞle. It has been
widely remarked, for instance, that some countries in transition acquired sig-
niÞcant ßows of FDI, while others only a trickle.4 Should we conclude, for
example, based on this uneven record, that the former group made wise deci-
sions while the latter did not? Or, should we conclude that the former chose
decisions to attract FDI, while the latter chose to pursue alternatives? While
these questions seem natural in the context of economies in transition, they
are more broadly applicable since an uneven pattern of distribution across
3See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Bardhan (1997), Kaufman
and Wei (1999), and Smarzynska and Wei (2000).
4See, for example, Campos and Coricelli (2000).
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countries is characteristic of FDI. Our work addresses some of these issues
by making explicit both the decision processes of the countries attempting
to attract FDI, and the decision process of the Þrm in choosing where, and
how, to locate.
In our model we study two governments, each considering whether or
not to compete to attract a foreign monopoly Þrm into its own domestic
market.5 The competition, should it occur, would involve oﬀering incentives
to the Þrm. The incentives, which are costly for the governments to provide,
lower the Þrms marginal cost of production. Faced with the oﬀers from
each country, the Þrm must choose one of four options: to enter either of
the markets, produce there and export to the other, to enter both markets
simultaneously with only local production, or to reject all oﬀers. We Þnd
conditions under which it would be optimal for one of the two countries not
to compete with the other, preferring instead to import the commodity from
the country that attracted the Þrm, rather than incurring the additional costs
that would have been necessary to make its own economy more attractive to
the foreign Þrm. We also show that when importing is a possibility, there are
conditions under which, knowing that it will lose (win) the competition for
the Þrm, the country nonetheless Þnds it optimal to (not) compete. Finally,
we establish the relationship between the option chosen by the Þrm and the
characteristics of the two governments trying to attract the Þrm.
5We make no distinction between a country and its government and use the terms
interchangeably.
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Other gaming models that involve incentives oﬀered by a government
to attract a Þrm include Brander and Spencer (1987), Haaparanta (1996),
Barros and Cabral (2000), and Janeba (2001). For example, Brander and
Spencer can be interpreted in our framework by imagining that the two dif-
ferent policy options (taxation or tariﬀ) are assigned to two separate coun-
tries, which otherwise share identical characteristics, and do not have the
ability to export output to the other. Each country acts unilaterally in try-
ing to attract FDI from a single Þrm. Haaparanta has a game of subsidies
between the two countries, but the Þrm has already committed to investing
in them and is only considering how to divide a known expenditure between
the two countries. Barros and Cabral consider two countries already hav-
ing decided to compete for a foreign Þrm using subsidies to lower the Þrms
marginal cost. The Þrm has only two choices: to set up and produce either
in country 1 and export to country 2, or to set up and produce in country 2
and export to country 1. Janeba studies two countries, the smaller of which
seeks to attract production from a Þrm in the larger country. In considering
the established tax policy in the larger country, the Þrm, when oﬀered a tax
incentive that could possibly change from the smaller country, chooses to set
up capacity and then produce in either of the two countries, or in both of
them. Some other papers that relate to ours include Barros (1994), Motta
(1992), Kaufman and Wei (1999), and Smarzynska and Wei (2000).
We make two main contributions to this literature. First, by allowing the
government to decide to compete or not compete for FDI, we have enlarged
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its strategic choice set. This permits us to show that it is not necessarily
because it would lose in a competition for FDI that a government would
choose not to compete. Nor is it necessarily because a government would win
a competition for FDI that it would choose to compete. Thus, we are able to
conclude that winning or losing a competition for FDI might be a strategic
choice of a government. Second, by allowing the Þrm to choose among four
options, we have enlarged the choice set of the Þrm. This allows us to show
the relationship of the characteristics of the countries to the market structure
that the Þrm would choose.
The plan of the paper is a follows. In Section 2 we present our model. In
Section 3 we analyze the game for speciÞc demand and cost functions. We
present a discussion and conclusions in Section 4.
2 The Model
2.1 Governments: The Game They Face
There are two governments, G1 and G2, which are each interested in attract-
ing a foreign monopoly Þrm to set up production of a homogeneous good in
their country. The motivation for wishing to attract this Þrm and hence FDI
may be the knowledge or technology spillovers that are said to accrue from
FDI, or the lowering of existing unemployment that the FDI might aﬀord.
Each Gi makes an oﬀer to the Þrm that we model as the marginal cost of
producing its output that the Þrm would face if it located in that country.
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This summary number reßects the actual cost of production in that country,
and depends on the given infrastructural of the country, the quality of its
legal system, its level of corruption, etc. Each Gi chooses to compete for the
Þrm (C) or not to compete (NC). If a Gi chooses not to compete, its oﬀer
of marginal cost remains at its initial value which we denote by ωi0, i = 1, 2.
If a Gi chooses to compete, then at a cost, the country oﬀers the Þrm the
marginal cost ωi < ωi0. The proÞt maximizing Þrm makes its decision based
on the oﬀers given by the countries.
2.2 The Firm: The Structure it Chooses
Given two oﬀers of marginal cost, ω1 and ω2 from G1 and G2, respectively,
the Þrm chooses one of the following four options to maximize its proÞts:
Option 1 : Accept the oﬀer of ω1 from G1. Establish production in G1
for Þxed cost F and produce for the markets in G1 and G2 from G1. The
marginal cost of producing a unit in G1 and selling it in G2 is augmented by
trade costs s1.
Option 2 : Accept the oﬀer of ω2 from G2. Establish production in G2
for Þxed cost F and produce for the markets in G2 and G1 from G2. The
marginal cost of producing a unit in G2 and selling it in G1 is augmented by
trade costs s2.
Option 3 : Accept the oﬀer of ω1 from G1 and the oﬀer of ω2 from G2.
Establish production in G1 for Þxed cost F and produce there only for the
market in G1, and establish production in G2 for Þxed cost F and produce
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there only for the market in G2. We refer to this simultaneous establishment
of production facilites in G1 and G2 as the multinational option.6
Option 4 : Accept neither oﬀer of ω1 or ω2 and set up in neither G1 nor
G2.
Let π1(ω1), π2(ω2), π(ω1, ω2), and π0(ω1, ω2) be the proÞt to the Þrm
when the respective options are chosen. If we let π∗ = max[π1, π2, π, π0],
then being a proÞt maximizer, the Þrm chooses Option 1 when π∗ = π1,
Option 2 when π∗ = π2, Option 3 when π∗ = π and Option 4 when π∗ =
π0. When π∗ is not unique, we assume that the Þrm is indiﬀerent between
the options.
Assume that the Þrm is capable of producing a single, homogeneous com-
modity. We let Qi(P ) be the demand function for this commodity produced
in Gi and Pi(ω) be the Þrms proÞt maximizing price in Gi when marginal
cost is ω. That is,
Pi(ω) = argmax
P
[PQi(P )− ωQi(P )− F ].
It is easily shown that
π1(ω1) = −Q
2
1(P1)
Q01(P1)
− F − Q
2
2(P12)
Q02(P12)
,
6Since the Þrm could already be producing in a home country before facing these
options, the term multinational, as it has been used elsewhere, could apply to Option 1
and Option 2 as well. However, since in our model the Þrm need not have existed prior to
this choice, we use the term multinational to distinguish Option 3 from Options 1 and 2.
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where P1 = P1(ω1) and P12 = P2(ω1 + s1), (1)
π2(ω2) = −Q
2
2(P2)
Q02(P2)
− F − Q
2
1(P21)
Q01(P21)
,
where P2 = P2(ω2) and P21 = P1(ω2 + s2), and
π(ω1, ω2) = −Q
2
1(P1)
Q01(P1)
− Q
2
2(P2)
Q02(P2)
− 2F.
We further assume that
π0(ω1, ω2) = 0.
The assumption that the Þxed costs F are identical in both countries could
be relaxed but at the cost of complicating the notation further.
2.3 Determining the Governments Final Bids
If the governments choose (NC,NC), then they stay with their initial oﬀers
ω10 and ω20, which we assume are unacceptable to the Þrm, that is, π1(ω10) <
0, and π2(ω20) < 0.7 It follows that π(ω10, ω20) < π1(ω10) + π2(ω20) < 0 and
therefore π∗ = π0 and the Þrm sets up in neither country (Option 4 ).
If the governments choose (C,NC), then G2 remains at the unacceptable
oﬀer of ω20, that is, π2(ω20) < 0. This, in turn, implies that for any ω1 > 0,
7This assumption is not required for what follows, but is made to reduce the number
of cases to consider. In making this assumption, we have in mind countries, which for
whatever reasons, would be unattractive places for the Þrm to establish production without
some further action on their parts, e.g., the economies in transition in the immediate post-
Soviet period.
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π1(ω1) > π(ω1, ω20). Thus, for any ω1 > 0 such that π1(ω1) > 0, G1 would
win the Þrm and export to G2. This can be thought of as a special case
of Bertrand competition between the countries when only G1 is allowed to
undercut the other oﬀer. With G2 Þxed at its unacceptable oﬀer ω20, G1
would choose the oﬀer that maximizes its net beneÞts, provided this oﬀer
were acceptable to the Þrm. We call the oﬀer that maximizes G1s net beneÞts
ω1M . If ω1M were unacceptable to the Þrm, G1 would have to lower its oﬀer
to the point where proÞt for the Þrm were non-negative, assuming that this
lower oﬀer provided positive beneÞts to the country. We call the oﬀer that
produces zero proÞt to the Þrm ω1B.We let α12 be the Þnal oﬀer of G1 which
wins the Þrm, that is, α12 = ω1M if ω1M is acceptable to the Þrm; otherwise,
α12 = ω1B if ω1B is acceptable to G1. If ω1B is unacceptable to G1, then G1
is unwilling to provide an oﬀer low enough to entice the Þrm. This would
result in the Þrm not entering either market. We denote the net beneÞts to
G1 and G2, respectively, when the Þrm is won by G1 (Option 1 ) at the oﬀer
α12 by (B112(α12), B
2
12(α12)). If ω1B is unacceptable to G1, then the payoﬀs
are (0,0).
Similarly, if the governments choose (NC,C), we also have a special case
of Bertrand competition. In this case, G1 remains at its initial oﬀer ω10 and
G2 chooses its net beneÞt maximizing value called ω2M , or the point where
the Þrms non-negative proÞt is just suﬃcient to attract it to G2, called
ω2B. As above, we let α21 denote the winning bid that leads to the payoﬀs
(B121(α21), B
2
21(α21)) to G1 and G2 respectively, with G2 winning the Þrm
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(Option 2 ). If ω2B is unacceptable to G2, then the payoﬀs are (0,0).
If the governments choose (C,C), they compete by undercutting each
other in a Bertrand competition. Before we consider the consequences of
this competition, we need additional deÞnitions. Let (iB111(α
∗
i1), iB
2
11(α
∗
i2)),
i = 1, ..., 4, represent the net beneÞts to G1 and G2, respectively, at the
conclusion of the Bertrand competition when the Þnal bids of the competition
at which the beneÞts are evaluated are α∗i1 and α
∗
i2 for the respective countries
and the Þrm chooses Option i. When i =1, the Þrm locates in G1 at the oﬀer
α∗11 and the beneÞts to G2 (the imports) just depend on α
∗
11, i.e., α
∗
12 = α
∗
11.
In this case, we call the common value α∗1. Similarly, when i=2, we set α
∗
2 =
α∗22 = α
∗
21. In the case when i=3, the beneÞts to each country depend on the
(possibly diﬀerent) bids of each Gi so we retain the notation of α∗3j, j = 1, 2.
For any Þnal oﬀer of marginal cost to the Þrm when the governments
choose (C,C), G1 can derive beneÞts in one of three ways depending on
the result of the Bertrand competition: by production taking place in that
country (Options 1 and 3 ) or by importing the product from G2 (Option
2 ).8 We assume that the net beneÞts to G1 of more production (Option 1 )
are greater than those of less production (Option 3 ). Furthermore, G1 would
never make an oﬀer which could produce a beneÞt less than the one it would
receive if it imported the good from G2. Thus, the lowest oﬀer that G1 would
8Recall that Option 4 yields zero net beneÞts.
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be willing to make, ω1L, satisÞes
3B
1
11(ω1L) = 2B
1
11(ω1L).
Similarly, ω2L satisÞes (2)
3B
2
11(ω2L) = 1B
2
11(ω2L).
We are now able to address the question of the Þnal bids from the
Bertrand competition when the governments choose (C,C).
Option 1 would be chosen by the Þrm if the bids ω1L and ω2L were made
and if they satisfy π1(ω1L) ≥ max[π2(ω2L), π(ω1L, ω2L), 0]. However, when
this inequality is strict, G1 does not have to make as low an oﬀer as ω1L to
win the Þrm. Instead, any oﬀer between ω1L and α1, with α1 > ω1L, will
win the Þrm for G1 where α1 satisÞes π1(α1) = max[π2(ω2L), π(α1, ω2L), 0].
Thus, the Þnal bid of G1 leading to Option 1 is α∗1, α
∗
1 ∈ [ω1L, α1], which will
depend on the net beneÞts function. At the oﬀer α∗1, G2 imports from G1.
Option 2 would be chosen in a similar fashion. The Þnal oﬀer α∗2 that
would lead to Option 2 would satisfy α∗2 ∈ [ω2L, α2] where α2 satisÞes
π2(α2) = max[π1(ω1L), π(ω1L, α2), 0]. At the oﬀer α∗2, G1 would import from
G2.
Option 3, the multinational option, would be chosen by the Þrm if,
at the lowest bids ω1L and ω2L, π(ω1L, ω2L) ≥ max[π1(ω1L), π2(ω2L), 0].
However, when this inequality is strict, G1 would choose the oﬀer of α∗31,
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α∗31 ∈ [ω1L, α31], and G2 would choose the oﬀer α∗32, α∗32 ∈ [ω2L, α32] where
α31 and α32 are as large an oﬀer as G1 and G2, respectively, can make without
changing the inequality. We later derive these values.
Option 4 is chosen by the Þrm when neither ω1L nor ω2L is acceptable to
it. That is, π1(ω1L) < 0, and π2(ω2L) < 0, implying that π(ω1L, ω2L) < 0,
and therefore that π∗ = π0.
2.4 Summarizing the Game the Governments Face
Each Gi independently chooses whether to compete for FDI or not. The
Gis share common knowledge of each others characteristics as well as of
the criteria upon which the choices are made. Each pair of choices induces
a Bertrand-type competition, the Þnal bids of which lead the Þrm to choose
one of its four options. In a one-period model with full information, the oﬀers
made by the governments are credible. The option chosen by the Þrm, in
turn, determines the net beneÞts accruing to each Gi. In strategic form we
have:
Game Matrix 1
G2
G1
C NC
C (iB
1
11(α
∗
i1), iB
2
11(α
∗
i2)), i = 1, ..., 4 (B
1
12(α12), B
2
12(α12)) or (0, 0)
NC (B121(α21), B
2
21(α21)) or (0, 0) (B
1
22, B
2
22) = (0, 0)
.
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2.5 Evaluating the Net BeneÞts
In order to proceed in this investigation, we must assume some form of the
net beneÞts functions or, equivalently, some objectives of the governments
involved. The governments could be self-serving, corrupt, or concerned with
the welfare of their respective populations. We choose to model the latter
but note that the development below would be the same for any speciÞcation
of these functions. In particular, we assume that when a Þrm establishes
production within a country, that country beneÞts in two ways: Þrst, by the
consumer surplus it receives as a consequence of the production, and second,
by additional beneÞts that accrue from the act of production itself. On the
other hand, when a country only receives imports, its beneÞts are restricted
to the consumer surplus. Firm proÞts provide no beneÞts to the host country
since we assume they are completely repatriated to the Þrms home country.
The consumer surplus of own-country production and that of importing the
product will diﬀer as a function of the price at which the good is sold in each
country.
Beyond consumer surplus, we assume a country receives additional ben-
eÞts as a consequence of production. These may be due, for example, to
additional employment (see Brander and Spencer (1987) and Barros and
Cabral (2000)) or to additions to know-how gained from the technology
transfer or spillover aspects of the particular production (see Borensztein,
De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), Campos and Coricelli (2000), Saggi (2002),
and UN Economic Commission of Europe (2001)). In particular, we assume
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for tractability that the additional beneÞts accruing from production are pro-
portional to that production, with ki being the constant of proportionality
for Gi.
We assume that when Gi chooses to compete and wins the competition at
the marginal cost, say ω, it incurs a cost for having won the Þrm. This cost,
for example, represents expenditures made by Gi to improve the physical
infrastructure of the country or to reduce corruption. For Gi this cost of
winning is given by the function ci(ω), which is a decreasing convex function
of the oﬀer ω. (Recall that it is more costly for a country to oﬀer a lower ω.)
Furthermore, we assume for convenience that ci(ω) is a proportional cost,
that is, proportional to beneÞts. When Gi chooses to compete and loses the
competition, we assume that it incurs a Þxed proportional cost for having
participated in the competition. We denote this cost by di, i = 1, 2, where
di is proportional to beneÞts. When Gi chooses not to compete, it incurs no
costs, but might get some beneÞts from imports.
The net beneÞts for each country for the various outcomes of the game can
now be described. For the outcome (C,NC), G2 remains at the unacceptable
oﬀer ω20 and G1 acts alone, making its most advantageous oﬀer α12. If this
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oﬀer wins the Þrm, the net beneÞts to G1 are
B112 = [consumer surplus at P1(α12) + additional beneÞts of production]
x [1 - cost of making the oﬀer α12]
= [
Z
P≥P1(α12)
Q1(P )dP + k1 {Q1[P1(α12)] +Q2[P2(α12 + s1)]}](1− c1(α12))
where 0 ≤ c1(·) ≤ 1, and the net beneÞts to G2 are
B212 = [consumer surplus at P2(α12 + s1)]
=
Z
P≥P2(α12+s1)
Q2(P )dP.
Since under (C,NC), G1 could never receive imports if it failed to attract
the Þrm, and since there is always a positive net beneÞt to G1 from attracting
the Þrm, the outcome B112 = B
2
12 = 0 is excluded here.
Similarly, for the outcome (NC,C), G2 acts alone, making its most ad-
vantageous oﬀer α21. This oﬀer wins the Þrm and the net beneÞts to G2
are
B221 = [
Z
P≥P2(α21)
Q2(P )dP +k2 {Q2[P2(α21)] +Q1[P2(α21 + s2)]}](1− c2(α21))
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where 0 ≤ c2(·) ≤ 1 and the net beneÞts to G1 are
B121 =
Z
P≥P1(α21+s2)
Q1(P )dP.
Again, the outcome B221 = B
1
21 = 0 is excluded.
The beneÞts to the outcome (NC,NC) are zero for each country since
ω10 and ω20 are asssumed to be unacceptable to the Þrm.
The evaluation of the payoﬀs in the upper left corner of the game matrix,
(C,C), is more complicated because the payoﬀs depend on which option the
Þrm chooses when confronted with the Þnal oﬀer of the competition. There
are four options to consider. If the Þnal bid of the Bertrand competition
leads the Þrm to choose Option 1, then
1B
1
11 = [
Z
P≥P1(α∗1)
Q1(P )dP + k1 {Q1[P1(α∗1)] +Q2[P2(α∗1 + s1)]}](1− c1(α∗1))
and
1B
2
11 = [
Z
P≥P2(α∗1+s1)
Q2(P )dP ](1− d2)
where 0 ≤ d2 ≤ 1.
If the Þnal bid of the Bertrand competition leads the Þrm to chooseOption
2, then
2B
2
11 = [
Z
P≥P2(α∗2)
Q2(P )dP + k2 {Q2[P2(α∗2)] +Q1[P1(α∗2 + s2)]}](1− c2(α∗2))
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and
2B
1
11 = [
Z
P≥P1(α∗2+s2)
Q1(P )dP ](1− d1)
where 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1.
If the Þnal bids of the Bertrand competition lead the Þrm to chooseOption
3, then the Þrm has accepted the Þnal oﬀers α∗31 and α
∗
32 from G1 and G2,
respectively. In this case,
3B
1
11 = [
Z
P≥P1(α∗31)
Q1(P )dP + k1Q1[P1(α
∗
31)]](1− c1(α∗31))
and
3B
2
11 = [
Z
P≥P2(α∗32)
Q2(P )dP + k2Q2[P2(α
∗
32)]](1− c2(α∗32)).
If the Þnal bid of the Bertrand competition leads the Þrm to choose Option
4, then 4B111 = 4B
2
11 = 0.
3 Analyzing the Game for SpeciÞc Demand
and Cost Functions
For the remainder of the paper, we assume speciÞc forms of the demand
functions and cost functions that enable us to explore the equilibria of Game
Matrix 1. We let Q1(P ) = e−P , Q2(P ) = fe−P , and ci(ω) = e−βiω, where
P, f, βi > 0, i = 1, 2. The parameter f reßects the relative size of the second
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market. We do not assume that this is less than one. In fact, as we later
show, the value of one for f is not critical. The parameter βi in the cost
function inversely reßects the cost (diﬃculty) to Gi of implementing the oﬀer
ω. If βi is suﬃciently small, then even a relatively high oﬀer has a large cost.
Conversely, a suﬃciently large value of βi implies a small cost for a relatively
low oﬀer.
Using these speciÞcations, the game, in strategic form, can be evaluated
as follows:
Game Matrix 2
G2
G1
C NC
C (iB
1
11(α
∗
i1), iB
2
11(α
∗
i1)), i = 1, ..., 4 (B
1
12(α12), B
2
12(α12))
NC (B121(α21), B
2
21(α21)) (B
1
22, B
2
22) = (0, 0)
where for (C,C):
(1B
1
11, 1B
2
11) =
¡
1K
1
11e
−α∗1 [1− e−β1α∗1 ], 1K211e−α∗1
¢
with 1K111 = e
−1[1 + k1 + k1fe−s1 ] and 1K211 = fe
−(1+s1)[1− d2],
(2B
1
11, 2B
2
11) = (2K
1
11e
−α∗2 , 2K211e
−α∗2
1 [1− e−β2α∗2 ])
with 2K111 = e
−(1+s2)[1− d1] and 2K211 = e−1[f + k2f + k2e−s2 ],
(3B
1
11, 3B
2
11) = (3K
1
11e
−α∗31 [1− e−β1α∗31 ], 3K211e−α∗32 [1− e−β2α∗32 ])
with 3K111 = e
−1[1 + k1] and 3K211 = e
−1f [1 + k2],
(4B
1
11, 4B
2
11) = (0, 0);
where for (C,NC):
(B112, B
2
12) = (K
1
12e
−α12 [1− e−β1α12 ],K212e−α12)
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with K112 = e
−1[1 + k1 + k1fe−s1] and K212 = fe
−(1+s1);
where for (NC,C):
(B121, B
2
21) = (K
1
21e
−α21 , K221e
−α21 [1− e−β2α21 ])
with K121 = e
−(1+s2) and K221 = e
−1[f + k2f + k2e−s2 ];
and where for (NC,NC):
(B122, B
2
22) = (0, 0).
The entries in the upper left position represent the net beneÞts to each
Gi when the Bertrand competition leads the Þrm to choose one of its four
options. In the upper right and lower left positions, when only one gov-
ernment is trying to undercut the other, there is only one possible choice
that the Þrm can make, i.e., to produce entirely in one country. The lower
right entry reßects the assumption that the initial oﬀers of marginal cost are
unacceptable to the Þrm.
To complete the description of the game matrix, we must evaluate α12,
α21, and α∗ij, i = 1, ..., 4; j = 1, 2. Since α12 and α21 depend on ωjM and
ωjB, j = 1, 2, and since α∗ij depends on ωjL, j = 1, 2, we next evaluate these
quantities.
3.1 Determining ω1M , ω2M , ω1B, ω2B, ω1L, ω2L
For the outcome (C,NC), G1 acts alone and, by our assumption about α12,
is guaranteed to win the Þrm. Thus the Þnal bid will either be ω1M or ω1B.
If α12 = ω1M , G1 maximizes its net beneÞts. Referring to the evaluations in
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Game Matrix 2, this maximum must satisfy
ω1M = argmax
ω
e−ω(1− e−β1ω).
It follows that e−β1ω1M = 1
1+β1
or e−ω1M = ( 1
1+β1
)
1
β1 . The maximum net
beneÞts achievable for G1 are K112(
β1
1+β1
)( 1
1+β1
)
1
β1 . When α12 = ω1B, G1 of-
fers the largest marginal cost that is acceptable to the Þrm, that is, the
marginal cost that produces non-negative proÞt for the Þrm. This oﬀer sat-
isÞes π1(ω1B) = 0, and using equations (1), the oﬀer can be written as
e−ω1B = eF
1+fe−s1 .
Similarly, when the choices are (NC,C), and when α21 = ω2M , this max-
imum satisÞes e−β2ω2M = 1
1+β2
and the maximum net beneÞts achievable for
G2 are K221(
β2
1+β2
)( 1
1+β2
)
1
β2 . Also, when α21 = ω2B, this value must satisfy
e−ω2B = eF
f+e−s2 .
Finally, we determine the lowest bid that G1 would be willing to make in
the Bertrand competition that occurs when the governments choose (C,C).
As discussed above, since the loss of the Þrm under these governmental
choices can still provide beneÞts via imports, there will be a lowest oﬀer
that each country would be willing to make. We can evaluate these lower
bids using the results in Game Matrix 2. If a given bid of ω by G1 were
the Þnal bid, then if it lost the Þrm completely to G2 (Option 2 ), G1 would
receive net beneÞts 2K111e
−ω. On the other hand, if it won it, it would ei-
ther win the entire production (Option 1 ) or part of the multinational Þrm
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(Option 3 ). Winning part of the multinational Þrm yields less net beneÞts
than winning the entire production. Thus, if the bid of ω wins, then it yields
at least 3K111e
−ω(1− e−β1ω). Since ω1L is the value of ω for which G1 would
be indiﬀerent to winning a part of the multinational Þrm or to losing the
Þrm completely and instead taking imports from G2, ω1L satisÞes 2K111e
−ω =
3K
1
11e
−ω(1 − e−β1ω) or e−β1ω1L = 1 − γ1 or ω1L = − 1β1 ln(1 − γ1) where
γ1 =
2K111
3K111
. Similarly, we have for G2 that ω2L satisÞes e−β2ω2L = 1 − γ2 or
ω2L = − 1β2 ln(1−γ2) where γ2 =
1K211
3K211
. Note that γ1 =
e−s2 (1−d1)
1+k1
and that ω1L
is monotonically increasing in γ1. Thus, the lower bound ω1L is decreasing
in k1, s2 and d1. Similarly, ω2L is decreasing in k2, s1 and d2.
We assume that when the Þrm faces a choice between two options that
yield the same proÞt, it will be indiﬀerent to the choice and we assign the
choice depending on the context. Furthermore, if a government faces two
choices that yield the same net beneÞts, we assume that it will be indiﬀerent
to the choice and we assign the choice depending on the context.
3.2 Determining the Equilibria
The game outlined above is one of complete information. As such, the ques-
tion arises as to whether it is ever desirable for a government to compete
for FDI if it knows that it will lose the Þrm in the competition. Conversely,
would a country that knows it would win the competition choose not to com-
pete? To address these questions, we explore the equilibria associated with
this game. We begin with a few deÞnitions.
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Let K = f+e
−s2
1+fe−s1 . Notice that K R 1 if and only if f R
1−e−s2
1−e−s1 . Thus, K
is a measure of relative size of the market in G2, adjusted for the costs of
selling in both markets. As a result, we refer to K as the size index. We
deÞned F as the Þxed cost of setting up production facilities in each country.
However, the units of F remain to be speciÞed. We measure the size of F in
units of revenue minus variable cost. Since the setup cost is identical in both
countries, we arbitrarily choose the revenue minus variable cost of G2 at its
lowest value, ω2L. Revenue minus variable cost in G2 is proportional to e−ω2
so we deÞne the size of the relative Þxed cost as R = eF
fe−ω2L where the scale
e
f
is chosen for later convenience. Note that since fe−(1+ω2L) is the quantity
demanded at the price P2(ω2L), R can be interpreted as the Þxed costs per
quantity sold.
Proposition 1 Let G1 and G2 choose (C,C) and let α1 = ω2L − lnK +
min[ln(Ke
−s1
1−R ), 0]. If the relative Þxed cost R satisÞes R ≤ 1, and if the minu-
mum bids satisfy ω1L ≤ α1, then π∗ = π1 for any Þnal bid by G1 between ω1L
and α1 and Þnal bid by G2 of ω2L. Thus, for any such bids, G1 wins the Þrm
in the Bertrand competition (Option 1).
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 1 focuses on the key ingredients that lead the Þrm to set up
its production in G1: the relative Þxed cost, the Þnal bids the countries are
willing to make, and the distinguishing characteristics of the countries. How
small ω1L needs to be relative to ω2L for π∗ = π1 depends in part on the
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ratio Ke
−s1
1−R . The smaller this ratio relative to unity, the smaller ω1L needs to
be. This ratio depends not only on R but also on the relative country sizes
(f) and the trade costs of selling goods in the other markets (s1 and s2).
Note that if R is suﬃciently large, then the proÞt of the Þrm would become
negative. Thus, an upper bound on R is needed to preclude the Þrm from
rejecting entirely the bid of G1.
From Section 3.1, the assumption of Proposition 1, ω1L ≤ α1, may be
written as 1
β1
ln(1 − γ1) ≥ 1β2 ln(1 − γ2) + lnK − min[ln(
Ke−s1
1−R ), 0]. This
involves the comparison of two "cost-beneÞt" type terms. Since ci(ω) = e−βiω
is a decreasing function of βi for each ω, we can think of
1
βi
as a simple
measure of the cost to Gi of making an oﬀer of marginal cost ω. Also,
1−γ1 = 1− e
−s2(1−d1)
1+k1
can be thought of as a measure of bargaining advantage
to G1 in attracting the Þrm, with a similar interpretation for 1− γ2 for G2.
Thus, this assumption, which compares the product of these terms, captures
the relative strengths of the two governments in the Bertrand competition.
A consequence of this proposition is that even if the two countries are
identical, i.e., β1 = β2, s1 = s2, k1 = k2, d1 = d2, and f = K = 1, it is
not clear what choice the Þrm will make without further information. This
follows since, for these values, the conditions required in the proposition for
Option 1 to be chosen reduce to 1− e−s1 ≤ R ≤ 1. If, however, R < 1− e−s1 ,
then Option 3, the multinational choice, would be made by the Þrm as we
show below in the discussion following Proposition 5.
Another consequence of ω1L ≤ α1 is that the winner of the Þrm need
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not necessarily be the country with the lower Þnal bid. For example, if
s1 = s2, k1 = k2, d1 = d2, and K < 1, then the condition for Option 1
becomes ω1L ≤ ω2L + b, where b > 0 when Ke−s1 ≥ 1−R, suggesting that,
ceteris paribus, G1 could win the Þrm even if its lowest oﬀer were greater
than that of G2, i.e., ω1L > ω2L.We note that this comports with the recent
empirical Þndings of, for example, Brock (1998) and Carr, Markusen and
Maskus (2002) that lowest wage costs alone do not necessarily attract FDI.
Another form of competition that has been described in the literature
for attracting a Þrm is based on trade barriers (see, for example, Brander
and Spencer (1987) and Motta (1992)). Although we do not incorporate
trade barriers as strategic variables in our game, Proposition 1 provides some
indication as to the impact of such barriers. For example, if G2 were to impose
large import tariﬀs, s1 would become large. As a result, γ2 would decrease,
giving G2 the ability to oﬀer better terms to the Þrm. The eﬀect of this shift
would be that the Þrm would be less likely to setup production in G1. If
both countries imposed large tariﬀs, then it would become more likely that
the Þrm would choose the multinational option or to locate in neither G1 nor
G2. These considerations are explored below in Proposition 5.
Proposition 1 establishes a range of bids within which G1 wins the Þrm.
However, the particular bid that wins the Bertrand competition, α = α∗1,
is the one in this interval that maximizes the net beneÞts to G1. We next
identify this oﬀer.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the Þnal bid of the
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Bertrand competition corresponding to the choices (C,C), can take on only
one of three values; that is α∗1 = α1 if ω1L ≤ α1 ≤ ω1M , α∗1 = ω1M if ω1L ≤
ω1M ≤ α1, and α∗1 = ω1L if ω1M ≤ ω1L ≤ α1.
Proof See Appendix.
The next proposition establishes conditions under which the bids α12 and
α21, corresponding to the oﬀ-diagonal choices of the governments, can be
uniquely identiÞed.
Proposition 3 Let e−1 ≤ eF
1+fe−s1 ≤ 1 and e−1 ≤ eFf+e−s2 ≤ 1. Then,
(1) the equations ( 1
1+x
)
1
x = eF
1+fe−s1 and (
1
1+x
)
1
x = eF
f+e−s2 have unique
solutions x = β1B and x = β2B, respectively, and
(2) if ci(ω) = e−βiBω, then ωiM = ωiB, i = 1, 2, and α12 = ω1M = ω1B
and α21 = ω2M = ω2B.
Proof See Appendix.
We are now able to establish the conditions that lead to unique equilibria
of the game. We show that there are cases in which a government would
compete for FDI knowing it will lose the competition, as well as other cases
in which a government would choose to not compete for FDI even knowing
that it would win the competition.
Proposition 4 Let ci(ω) = e−βiBω, i = 1, 2, where βiB are determined under
the conditions of Proposition 3. Furthermore, let 1 − Ke−s1 ≤ R ≤ 1, and
ω1L ≤ ω2L − lnK. Then,
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(1) if 1− d1 > h1K where h1 = 1+k11+k1+k1fe−s1 and 1− d2 >
f
f+e−s2R, (C,C)
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (C,C) the Þrm
chooses Option 1, i.e., G1 wins the Þrm;
(2) if 1 − d1 > h1K and 1 − d2 < ff+e−s2R, (C,NC) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (C,NC) the Þrm chooses Option
1, i.e., G1 wins the Þrm;
(3) if 1 − 1
1+β1B
< h2
K
where h2 = e
−s2
1+k1+k1fe−s1
and 1 − d2 > ff+e−s2R,
(NC,C) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (NC,C)
the Þrm chooses Option 2, i.e., G2 wins the Þrm.
Proof See Appendix.
By Þxing the cost functions at the parameters β1B and β2B, we have
assumed in Proposition 4 that each Gi, when acting to maximize its own
net beneÞts, would choose to oﬀer the Þrm its countrys breakeven value. It
is also assumed that, at these parameter values, the "cost-beneÞt" factor of
G1, described in the discussion following Proposition 1, is suﬃciently large
compared to that of G2. When we add two more assumptions, that the costs
of participating in the competition and losing, d1 and d2, are not too large, we
show in part (1) of Proposition 4 that (C,C) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Since this is a game of complete information, part (1) demonstrates that there
are instances in which a government (G2, here), knowing that it will lose the
competition for FDI, still Þnds it in its interest to compete. This occurs
because the result of the Bertrand competition forces G1s marginal cost,
and thereby its price, lower. As a result, imports in G2 are cheaper and G2s
27
consumer surplus increases enough to oﬀset the cost of participating in the
competition. Note that small values of di are not suﬃcient to satisfy these
inequalities, and, in fact, if either di = 0, then the respective inequalities
could or could not be satisÞed, depending on the values of K, hi, etc.
As the last remarks suggest, a delicate balance in the parameters must
exist to make it desirable for G2 to compete knowing it will lose. In part (2)
of Proposition 4 we show that, as one might expect, there are cases where,
if a government knows it will lose, it will choose not to compete.
In part (3) of Proposition 4 we invoke another assumption that puts a
bound on β1B. Combining this assumption with the assumption that led to
the conclusion that G2 would opt to compete, we show that (NC,C) is the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game. In this game of complete informa-
tion, and knowing therefore that it would win the Bertrand competition, G1
nonetheless Þnds it advantageous not to compete. Part of the explanation
of this is seen in the assumption that β1B is small, or
1
β1B
is large, implying
that the cost of making the oﬀer that would result from the Bertrand com-
petition is too costly an oﬀer to make. Again, some care must be taken in
interpreting the upper bound of this parameter as this upper bound depends
on the parameters K, hi, etc.
How dependent are the conclusions of Proposition 4 on the selection of
parameters that led to the choice of Option 1 resulting from the Bertrand
competition? To answer this question, we must consider parameter values
that would lead the Þrm to choose other options and show that the three
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Nash equilibria would still hold. Because of the symmetry between Option
1 and Option 2, we omit this case, and move to explore the situation where
the Bertrand competition would lead to Option 3.
Proposition 5 Let G1 and G2 choose (C,C). If the relative Þxed cost R
satisÞes R ≤ 1−Ke−s1 , and if the minimum bids satisfy ω2L−ln[es1(1−R)] ≤
ω1L ≤ ω2L − ln[e−s2 + fR], then π∗ = π for any Þnal bid by G1 between ω1L
and α31, where α31 satisÞes e−α31 = e−(ω2L+s2) + eF, and any Þnal bid by G2
between ω2L and α32, where α32 satisÞes e−α32 = e−(ω1L+s1) + eFf . Thus, for
any such pair of bids, the Þrm elects to become a multinational (Option 3).
Proof See Appendix.
It is not surprising that a condition that makes the multinational option
attractive to the Þrm is one that forces the relative Þxed cost R to be small
enough to warrant paying the Þxed cost twice. The bound on R depends on,
and cannot be determined separate from, the parameters that characterize
the countries. But, smallness of the relative Þxed cost is not enough for
the Þrm to elect to become a multinational. A second condition imposes a
balancing requirement between the Þnal possible oﬀers of the governments.
However, this balancing requirement is, by itself, not enough to cause the
Þrm to choose the multinational option. For example when the two countries
are identical, i.e., β1 = β2, s1 = s2, k1 = k2, d1 = d2, and f = K = 1, it
follows that ω1L = ω2L and the multinational option will be chosen if and
only if R ≤ 1− e−s1 . In fact, even if K 6= 1, so long as ω1L = ω2L, the second
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condition will be satisÞed if and only if R ≤ 1−Ke−s1 . In general, similarity
of the countries, plus a low relative Þxed cost, are both needed to produce
the multinational outcome.
Proposition 5 establishes a range of bids within which the Þrm chooses to
become a multinational. However, the particular bids that win the Bertrand
competition, α∗31 and α
∗
32, are the ones that maximize the net beneÞts of the
respective governments.
We are now able to establish the unique Nash equilibria when the Bertrand
competition corresponding to (C,C) leads the Þrm to choose to become a
multinational.
Proposition 6 Let ci(ω) = e−βiBω, i = 1, 2, where βiB are determined under
the conditions of Proposition 3. Furthermore, let R ≤ 1−Ke−s1, and ω2L−
ln[es1(1−R)] ≤ ω1L ≤ ω2L − ln[e−s2 + fR]. Then,
(1) if 1 − d1 > 1f+e−s2 and 1 − d2 > f1+fe−s1 , (C,C) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (C,C) the Þrm chooses Option 3,
i.e., the Þrm sets up production in both G1 and G2, becoming a multinational;
(2) if 1−d1 > 1f+e−s2 and 1− 11+β2B < K
e−s1
1+k2
, (C,NC) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (C,NC) the Þrm chooses Option
1, i.e., G1 wins the Þrm;
(3) if 1 − 1
1+β1B
< e
−s2
K(1+k1)
and 1 − d2 > f1+fe−s1 , (NC,C) is the unique
Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (NC,C) the Þrm chooses
Option 2, i.e., G2 wins the Þrm.
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Proof See Appendix.
The conditions on R, ω1L, and ω2L in Proposition 6 imply that, should
the Gi choose (C,C), the Þrm would choose Option 3. However, the choice of
the governments to compete needs some further conditions. These limit the
size of the costs of competing and losing, i.e., the di. In part (1), where these
limits are satisÞed, (C,C) becomes the unique Nash equilibrium. In this
case, each government chooses partial production over the choice to import.
In part (2) of Proposition 6, the Þrm chooses Option 1. Here, G2 chooses
to import from G1 rather than to compete and have the Þrm set up produc-
tion in G2 for the market in G2 alone. The conditions that lead to this choice
by G2 are that its market is not too small, and that its cost of reducing its
oﬀer of marginal cost to the Þrm is large. Again, interpreting the bounds on
size and cost require knowledge of the parameters. Part (3) has a parallel
interpretation to part (2).
Proposition 6, together with Proposition 4, show that there are cases in
which the governments will choose to compete or will choose not to compete
whatever the forseen decision the Þrm would make in each situation.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
The model that we propose involves a game between two governments com-
peting to attract a single Þrm. Each government (country) is deÞned by Þve
characteristics: a demand function Qi, the costs ci(·) and di of competing to
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acquire FDI, the trade cost si of producing a unit of the good and selling it
in the other country, the size, 1 or f, of its market, and an objective function
Bi of the government seeking FDI. The Þrm chooses its market structure by
making one of four choices: to produce in G1 and export to G2, to produce
in G2 and export to G1, to produce in both G1 and G2 with no exports
(the multinational option), and to produce in neither G1 nor G2. We de-
rive the unique Nash equilibria corresponding to diﬀerent characteristics of
these countries. This allows us to establish the relationship of the countries
characteristics to the choice of participating or abstaining in a competition
to acquire FDI. Also, by establishing the links between the decisions of the
governments to compete and the structure of the Þrm, we are able to distin-
guish the conditions that would lead to the Þrm to become a multinational,
or alternatively, to set up production in one country and export to the other.
In many of the models relating to FDI, it is assumed either that the Þrm
has committed itself to engaging in FDI or that a government has committed
itself to competing to attract FDI. Our results suggest that Þrms or govern-
ments with such commitments have special characteristics that make these
commitments an outcome of a beneÞt-maximizing strategy. We show that
these special characteristics that lead a government to compete do not nec-
essarily imply that that government has an advantage in the competition.
This suggests that there is a heterogenity in the types of countries that com-
pete to attract FDI. Of the countries that attract FDI, for example, some of
them had the right characteristics to win in a competition for FDI and some
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of them won by default. Of the ones that won the Þrm through competi-
tion, some shared the Þrm with other countries (the multinational option),
and some did not. Complicating these subgroupings further is the group of
countries that would have won in the competition but chose for other rea-
sons not to compete. The recognition of these groupings might have some
consequences for empirical studies.
The actual cost to the government of making a Þnal oﬀer to attract a Þrm
plays an important role in our conclusions. By interpreting the source of this
cost, we can explore some of the consequences when the competing govern-
ments are of diﬀerent types. For example, the economies in transition at
the start of the transition process represented competing governments with
diﬀerent, albeit weak, infrastructures. When a country has a weak infras-
tructure, we could assume that it would be very costly for it to make all
the improvements necessary to reduce substantially the marginal cost that
the Þrm would face in setting up production there. Since the parameter 1
βi
reßects the size of this cost in our model, small values of βi would char-
acterize governments with poor infrastructures. Ceteris paribus, this would
force the Þrm to seek production elsewhere, as seen in Propositions 4 and
6. Similarly, a large cost could also be the consequence of certain types of
governmental corruption. For a corrupt government to make a given oﬀer
of marginal cost to a Þrm, it would have to spend more to make that oﬀer
than would a non-corrupt government. Thus, for such corrupt governments,
1
βi
would be large and would tend, again, to dissuade the Þrm from setting
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up production. However, in any competitive situation, it is really the rela-
tive cost of one government, as compared with that of the other, that is the
critical comparison.
We also establish the relationship between the characteristics of the gov-
ernments and the structure of the Þrm. As a result, we are able to add to a
number of observations made in the literature. First, it is often argued that
the size of a market is a magnet for FDI. Our results show that the size of the
market plays a more nuanced role in attracting FDI. If f, the size of country
2, is large relative to country 1 (f → ∞), then K approaches the value es1
and G1 would still attract the Þrm if ω1L+ s1 < ω2L as Proposition 1 shows.
Furthermore, even if this last inequality were reversed, the Þrm might choose
to split its production between the countries (the multinational option) as
in Proposition 5. This choice would depend on limf→∞ fR. Of course, when
the two countries are identical except for size, leading to ω1L = ω2L, then
as f → ∞, country 1 would never acquire the Þrm in its entirety. Thus
the importance of size is in direct relationship to the similarity between the
countries. As the characteristics diverge, the importance of size is tempered
by these distinguishing characteristics.9
9Note, for example, the recent decision of Peugeot to build a factory in Slovakia rather
than in Poland. "Poland had originally been tipped as the favored site, and news that the
carmaker had chosen its smaller southern neighbor shook Warsaw." (International Herald
Tribune (IHT), "Slovak plant extends Peugeots reach in East," January 16, 2003, p.
10.) Also, according to the head of Polands super-ministry for economy, labor and social
aﬀairs: "If we cant resolve the problems with our roads, infrastructure and logistics, we
have to expect such decisions  despite Polands other advantages." (Reuters News Article,
"Peugeot Citroen picks Slovakia for new plant," January 15, 2003.)
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Second, low production costs are sometimes referred to as another magnet
for FDI. Again, our model suggests a more nuanced role for production costs.
As discussed above following Proposition 1, the lowest oﬀer of marginal cost
does not necessarily attract the Þrm. Also, the relative sizes of the two Þnal
oﬀers by themselves, and indeed, even if they were equal, do not determine
whether the Þrm produces exclusively in one country or divides its production
between the two countries. Furthermore, two countries with the same Þnal
oﬀers could have diﬀerent characteristics since in our model the Þnal oﬀers
depend on a function of βi, si, and ki. Thus, we would expect that the Þrm
might be attracted to countries with very diﬀerent characteristics.
Third, it is sometimes argued that by raising import tariﬀs, a government
can entice a Þrm to set up production in that country. As discussed following
Proposition 1, if, say G1, were to engage in this behavior, then ceteris paribus,
the Þrm would be less likely to locate in G2. But, if both G1 and G2 raised
their tariﬀs, the Þrm would not necessarily go to either country alone, but
could choose the multinational option. In general, the consequences of raising
tariﬀs are diﬃcult to forecast since the raising of the values of s1 and s2 aﬀect
the lowest bids of the countries as well as the size index and the relative Þxed
costs.
In sum, we show that to assume at the outset that two countries compete
for FDI diverts attention from the strategic nature of such a decision. By
studying this decision, we are not only able to demonstrate how a countrys
characteristics relate to this choice, but also to establish the relationship
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between this choice and the decision of the Þrm as to where to locate and
produce.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof Let ω1 ∈ [ω1L, α1] and ω2 = ω2L be the Þnal bids. Evaluat-
ing equations (1), we have that π1 ≥ π2 if e−(1+ω1) − F + fe−(1+ω1+s1) ≥
fe−(1+ω2)−F + e−(1+ω2+s2) or if e−ω1 [1+ fe−s1 ] ≥ e−ω2[f + e−s2 ] or if e−ω1 ≥
e−ω2K or if ω1 ≤ ω2 − lnK. Also, π1 ≥ π if e−(1+ω1) − F + fe−(1+ω1+s1) ≥
e−(1+ω1) + fe−(1+ω2) − 2F or if e−ω1 ≥ es1(e−ω2 − eF
f
) = es1e−ω2(1−R) since
ω2 = ω2L. So, π1 ≥ π if ω1 ≤ ω2−s1−ln(1−R) = ω2−lnK+ln(Ke−s11−R ). Thus,
for π1 to be no less than both π2 and π, ω1 ≤ ω2− lnK+min[ln(Ke−s11−R ), 0] =
α1 which was assumed.
To complete the proof, we must show that π1 ≥ 0 at these oﬀers, i.e.,
that e−ω1 ≥ eF
1+fe−s1 . By the deÞnition of R,
eF
1+fe−s1 =
f
f+e−s2Ke
−ω2LR. Thus,
π1 ≥ 0 if ω1 ≤ ω2L − lnK − ln( fRf+e−s2 ). Since R ≤ 1, the right-hand-side of
the last inequality is greater than α1, and it follows that π1 ≥ 0. ♣
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof Under Proposition 1, any oﬀer between ω1L and α1 will win the
Þrm for G1. Therefore, G1 will choose the oﬀer to maximize its net beneÞts
36
from Option 1. The net beneÞts function is proportional to e−ω(1− e−β1ω).
This function is unimodal with a unique maximum satisfying e−β1ω1M = 1
1+β1
.
Furthermore, the net beneÞts function is monotonically increasing for 0 ≤
ω ≤ ω1M and monotonically decreasing for ω > ω1M . Thus, if ω1M > α1, the
net beneÞts will be maximized at α∗1 = α1.When ω1L < ω1M ≤ α1, α∗1 = ω1M
and when ω1M ≤ ω1L, α∗1 = ω1L. ♣
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof Since ( 1
1+x
)
1
x is a continuous, strictly increasing function that
goes from e−1 to 1 as x goes from 0 to ∞, and since, by assumption, both
eF
1+fe−s1 and
eF
f+e−s2 are in the interval [e
−1, 1], part (1) follows. To show part
(2), recall that e−ωiM = ( 1
1+βi
)
1
βi . Setting βi = βiB implies that e
−ω1M =
( 1
1+β1B
)
1
β1B = eF
1+fe−s1 = e
−ω1B . Similarly, e−ω2M = ( 1
1+β2B
)
1
β2B = eF
f+e−s2 =
e−ω2B . Thus, the two possible values that α12 can take, ω1M and ω1B, are the
same as are the two possible values that α21 can take, ω2M and ω2B. ♣
5.4 Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof We Þrst evaluate Game Matrix 2. The lower right element cor-
responding to (NC,NC), is (0, 0). The upper right position correspond-
ing to (C,NC) requires the speciÞcation of α12 which, by Proposition 3,
for β1 = β1B, is α12 = ω1M = ω1B. Similarly, for the lower left position,
α21 = ω2M = ω2B. In the upper left position the governments choose (C,C)
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and our assumptions are the same as in Proposition 1. From Proposition 1
we have that e−ω1L ≥ e−α1 = e−ω2LK. Also, by Proposition 1, e−α1 ≥ eF
1+fe−s2 .
But eF
1+fe−s2 = e
−ω1B = e−ω1M by Proposition 3. Thus, e−ω1L ≥ e−α1 ≥ e−ω1M ,
and by Proposition 2 (see proof), the Þnal bid of the Bertrand competion is
α∗1 = α1 and the Þrm chooses Option 1. Game Matrix 2 is, therefore,
G2
G1
C NC
C
1B
1
11 = 1K
1
11e
−α1(1− e−β1Bα1)
1B
2
11 = 1K
2
11e
−α1
B112 = K
1
12e
−ω1B(1− e−β1Bω1B)
B212 = K
2
12e
−ω1B = K212
eF
1+fe−s1
NC
B121 = K
1
21e
−ω2B = K121
eF
f+e−s2
B221 = K
2
21e
−ω2B(1− e−β2Bω2B)
B122 = 0
B222 = 0
To show part (1), we show that C is a dominant strategy for each govern-
ment. We Þrst show that C is a dominant strategy for G1. Since B112 > 0, we
need only show that 1B111 > B
1
21. Since e
−ω1L ≥ e−α1, then 1− e−β1Bα1 ≥ 1−
e−β1Bω1L. Earlier, we showed that e−β1Bω1L = 1−γ1. So, 1B111 = 1K111e−α1(1−
e−β1Bα1) ≥ γ1 1K111e−α1 = γ1 1K111e−ω2LK. From the fact that 1 ≥ R = eF/fe−ω2L ,
we have 1B111 ≥ γ1 1K111K eFf = γ1 1K111K (f+e
−s2 )
f
e−ω2B ≥ γ1 1K111Ke−ω2B . Fi-
nally, 1B111 > B
1
21 if γ1 1K
1
11K > K
1
21 or if
e−s2(1−d1)
1+k1
(e−1(1+k1+k1fe−s1))K >
e−(1+s2) or if (1 − d1)K > 1+k11+k1+k1fe−s1 or if (1 − d1)K > h1 which was as-
sumed to hold. We Þnally show that C is a dominant strategy for G2. Since
B221 > 0, we need to show that 1B
2
11 > B
2
12 or that 1K
2
11e
−α1 > K212e
−ω1B .
Rewriting the last inequality, we must show (1 − d2)Ke−ω2L > eF1+fe−s1 or
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1 − d2 > fRK(1+fe−s1 ) = ff+e−s2R, which is assumed to hold. Thus, the state-
ment of part (1) holds.
To show part (2), we show that C is a dominant strategy for G1 and that
1B
2
11 < B
2
12. The demonstration that C is a dominant strategy for G1 is the
same as in part (1) since we assume that 1− d1 > h1K . To show 1B211 < B212,
we need show that eF
1+fe−s1 > (1− d2)e−ω2LK. But this inequality is the same
as 1− d2 < fRK(1+fe−s1 ) = ff+e−s2R which is assumed.
To show part (3), we show that C is a dominant strategy for G2 and
that 1B111 < B
1
21. Since it is assumed that 1− d2 > ff+e−s2R, it follows as in
part (1) that C is a dominant strategy for G2. To show that 1B111 < B
1
21,
note that 1B111 = 1K
1
11e
−α1(1 − e−β1Bα1) ≤ 1K111e−ω1M (1 − e−β1Bω1M ) since
ω1M maximizes this function. Furthermore, e−β1Bω1M = 11+β1B , so 1B
1
11 ≤
1K
1
11
β1B
β1B+1
e−ω1M . Also, B121 = K
1
21e
−ω2B . Since ω1M = ω1B, 1B111 < B
1
21 if
1K
1
11
β1B
β1B+1
eF
1+fe−s1 < K
1
21
eF
f+e−s2 or if 1 − 1β1B+1 <
e−s2
K(1+k1+k1fe−s1 )
= h2
K
which
is assumed.♣
5.5 Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof First we show that for any Þnal oﬀers ω1 and ω2 for G1 and G2,
Option 3 would be chosen by the Þrm if max[e−(ω2+s2) + eF, 2eF − fe−ω2] ≤
e−ω1 ≤ es1(e−ω2 − eF
f
). To show this, we show that for oﬀers satisfying these
inequalities, π ≥ π1, π ≥ π2, and π ≥ 0. Since π = e−(1+ω1)+ fe−(1+ω2)− 2F
and π1 = e−(1+ω1) − F + fe−(1+ω1+s1), π ≥ π1 if e−ω1 ≤ es1(e−ω2 − eFf ). Since
π2 = fe
−(1+ω2)−F+e−(1+ω2+s2), it follows that π ≥ π2 if e−ω1 ≥ e−(ω2+s2)+eF.
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For π ≥ 0, e−ω1 ≥ 2eF − fe−ω2 .
The assumed inequalities involving ω1L and ω2L imply that e−ω2L(e−s2 +
fR) ≤ e−ω1L ≤ e−ω2Les1(1 − R). Since e−ω2LR = eF/f, the last inequality
can be written as e−(ω2L+s2) + eF ≤ e−ω1L ≤ es1(e−ω2L − eF
f
). Furthermore,
e−(ω2L+s2)+eF ≥ 2eF−fe−ω2L since this inequality holds when (1+ e−s2
f
) ≥ R
and R was assumed to satisfy R ≤ 1−Ke−s1 . So for the Þnal bids ω1L and
ω2L, π
∗ = π, and Option 3 is chosen by the Þrm.
If G2 were to oﬀer a higher bid than ω2L, so long as the right inequality
held, the same conclusion would hold. Also, if G1 were to oﬀer a higher bid
so long as the left inequality held, the same conclusion would hold. Thus, G2
could raise its bid up to α32 satisfying e−ω1L = es1(e−α32 − eFf ) and G1 could
raise its bid up to α31 satisfying e−α31 = e−(ω2L+s2)+eF . If either government
were to raise its bid beyond these values the other country would acquire the
entire Þrm. ♣
5.6 Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof We Þrst evaluate the Game Matrix 2. Under the assumptions
of this proposition, the payoﬀs in each of the positions of the game matrix
stay the same as those in Proposition 4 except for the upper left entry. In
the upper left position the conditions of Proposition 5 hold so that the Þrm
chooses Option 3 and each Gi receives the net beneÞts of local production
for its Þnal bids. Game Matrix 2 is, therefore,
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G2
G1
C NC
C
3B
1
11 = 3K
1
11e
−α∗31(1− e−β1Bα∗31)
3B
2
11 = 3K
2
11e
−α∗32(1− e−β2Bα∗32)
B112 = K
1
12e
−ω1B(1− e−β1Bω1B)
B212 = K
2
12e
−ω1B = K212
eF
1+fe−s1
NC
B121 = K
1
21e
−ω2B = K121
eF
f+e−s2
B221 = K
2
21e
−ω2B(1− e−β2Bω2B)
B122 = 0
B222 = 0
where from Proposition 5, ωiL ≤ α∗3i ≤ α3i.
To show part (1), we show that C is a dominant strategy for each gov-
ernment. For G1, we need only show that 3B111 > B
1
21 since B
1
12 > 0. Thus,
we need show that e−1(1 + k1)e−α
∗
31(1 − e−β1Bα∗31) > e−(1+s2) eF
f+e−s2 . Since
α∗31 ≥ ω1L, 1 − e−β1Bα∗31 ≥ 1 − e−β1Bω1L = 1 − (1 − γ1) = γ1 = e
−s2 (1−d1)
1+k1
.
Thus, to show that C is a dominant strategy for G1, it is enough to show
that e−α
∗
31 > 1
1−d1
eF
f+e−s2 . Since α
∗
31 ≤ α31, it is enough to show that e−α31 >
1
1−d1
eF
f+e−s2 . From Proposition 5, e
−α31 = e−(ω2L+s2)+eF so the last inequality
may be written as e−(ω2L+s2)+ eF [1− 1
(1−d1)(f+e−s2 ) ] > 0. This inequality will
hold if the coeﬃcient of eF is non-negative. Since 1 − 1
(1−d1)(f+e−s2 ) ≥ 0 if
1−d1 ≥ 1f+e−s2 , the inequality is satisÞed by assumption and C is a dominant
strategy for G1.
To show C is a dominant strategy for G2 we need only show that 3B211 >
B212 since B
2
21 > 0. Since ω2L ≤ α∗32 ≤ α32, the same argument for G2 implies
that we need only show that e−α32 = e−(ω1L+s1) + eF
f
> eF
(1−d2)(1+fe−s1 ) . This
inequality will hold if 1
f
≥ 1
(1−d2)(1+fe−s1) or if 1 − d2 >
f
1+fe−s1 which was
assumed.
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To show part (2), we show that C is a dominant strategy for G1 and
that 3B211 < B
2
12. The demonstration that C is a dominant strategy for G1 is
the same as in part (1) since, by assumption 1− d1 > 1f+e−s2 . To show that
3B
2
11 < B
2
12, we need to show that 3K
2
11e
−α∗32(1 − e−β2Bα∗32) < K212 eF1+fe−s1 or
e−α
∗
32(1 − e−β2Bα∗32) < e−s1
1+k2
eF
1+fe−s1 . The left-hand-side of this last inequality
is no greater than its maximum value and e−ω2M (1− e−β2Bω2M ) = e−ω2B(1−
1
1+β2B
) = eF
f+e−s2 (1 − 11+β2B ) (the last two equations follow since when β2 =
β2B, ω2M = ω2B). Thus, 3B
2
11 < B
2
12 if 1 − 11+β2B <
e−s1
1+k2
f+e−s2
1+fe−s1 = K
e−s1
1+k2
which is assumed.
To show part (3), we show that C is a dominant strategy for G2 and
that 3B111 < B
1
21. Since 1 − d2 > f1+fe−s1 , it follows from above that C is
a dominant strategy for G2. To show that 3B111 < B
1
21, we need to show
e−α
∗
31(1 − e−β1Bα∗31) < e−s2
1+k1
eF
f+e−s2 . The left-hand-side of this inequality is no
greater than e−ω1M (1− e−β1Bω1M ) = e−ω1B(1− 1
1+β1B
) = eF
1+fe−s1 (1 − 11+β1B ).
Thus, 3B111 < B
1
21 if 1− 11+β1B < K
−1 e−s2
1+k1
which is assumed. ♣
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